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THE USE -OF FORMER TESTIMONY
[CONCLUDED FROM THE JANUARY NUMBER.]

TESTIMONY BEFORE COMMITTING MAGISTRATE

The testimony delivered before a justice of the peace or other
committing magistrate was usable in the later trial of the accused
after the death of the witness, the accused having been represented by counsel and had full opportunity to cross-examine.'
Although the act of May 23d, 1887, P. L. 159, allows the use of
former testimony in a criminal case whenever it has been delivered in a proceeding conducted "in or before a court of record,"
and the defendant has been present and had an opportunity to
examine or cross-examine, the right to use the testimony which
has been given before the committing magistrate, who is not a
court of record, still exists.'
FORMER TESTIMONY NOT RECEIVABLE
In assumpsit by two plaintiffs for goods sold, defendant offered evidence of what A (now dead) had sworn before a judge
at chambers, on a motion to discharge him on common bail, in
the presence of one of the plaintiffs. The evidence was properly
excluded. Says Shippen, C. J., "Questions of bail before a judge
in his chamber are not to be considered as trials in a court of
record, wherein the testimony of witnesses at a former trial may
be received as evidence in case of their death. The testimony
before the judge must be regarded as on the same footing as a
declaration in pais in the presence of the party. When the oppo'Brown v. Com., 73 Pa. 321; McLain v. Com., 99 Pa. 86.

'Com. v. Keck, 148 Pa. 639; Com. v. Lenousky, 206 Pa. 277.
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site party agrees to the statement, it is an admission; so if he is
silent, the maxim qui lacet consentire videtur applies. When he
totally denies the statement, proof of it is not admissible at all.'
NOT RECEIVABLE-TESTIMONY BEFORE CORONER
The hearing before the coroner in a homicide case is not to
ascertain the guilt of any particular person, but of any person
whom the evidence may implicate.
No cross-examination of
witnesses is had. The coroner's discretion marks the line where
the evidence of a witness shall begin and end. Hence, evidence
developed before him may not only not be used in the trial of X
for murder by the commonwealth, to affect the prisoner, but also
not by the prisoner, to defeat a conviction. Chapter 13, § 5, of
the statute of i and 2 Phil. and Mary requires the coroner in inquisitions finding murder or manslaughter to put in writing the
effect of the material evidence given to the jury before him, and
to certify and return the same with the inquisition. When so
taken, certified and returned, the courts of England have held the
evidence admissible on the later trial. But, when the witness is
still living, though sick, the rule would not apply.'
KINDS OF ACTIONS IN WHICH TESTIMONY
MAY BE USED
Former testimony may, when the proper conditions exist, be
employed in any form of proceeding, e. g., in trespass, for the
negligent killing of a father,' or for negligently causing personal
injuries,' in assumpsit,1 in ejectment,' in covenant for the price
'Jackson v. Winchester, 2 Y. 529.
2

McIain v. Com., 99 Pa. 86. The statute did not apply in this case,
also, because the evidence had not been taken down by the coroner or
under his direction; nor was it returned with the inquisition. It was
taken down by a short-hand writer at the instance of some undisclosed

person.
3
Delahunt v. T. & T. Co., 215 Pa. 241.
'Greenan v. Eggeling, 30 Super. 253; Becker v. Philadelphia, 217

Pa. 344; Giberson v. Patterson Mills Co., 187 Pa. 513; R. R. Co. v.
Spearen, 47 Pa. 300; Molloy v. U. S. Express Co., 22 Super. 173.
5

Pratt v. Patterson, 81 Pa. 114; Evans v. Reed, 78 Pa. 415; Wolf v.
Wyeth, 11 S. & R. 149; Wright v. Cumpsty, 41 Pa. 102; Walbridge v.
Knipper, 96 Pa. 48; Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 23 Pa. 72.
6

Moore v. Pearsov, 6 W. & S. 51; Rhine v. Robinson, 27 Pa. 30;

Eckman v. Eckman, 68 Pa. 460; Hawk v. Greensweig, 7 Pa. L. J. 374;

Beers v. Cornelius, 1 Pitts. 274; Covanhovan v. Hart, 21 Pa. 495.
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of land,' in debt for work and labor done,' in trespass for mesne
profits, 3 in trover and conversion of bonds of the United States,"
in a feigned issue, in a proceeding to open a judgment,' or in an
issue to determine testamentary capacity,' in trespass for a wrongful distress,' or for obstructing the use of water of a spring,8 in
a scifa sur mechanics' lien,' in criminal prosecutions, e. g., for
murder.'o
EXPERT TESTIMONY PROVABLE

The testimony the repetition of whose use is sought may be
of any sort, on any subject. It may be that of a witness as an
expert;" that of a physician, e. g., as to the nature of the ailment
of a party."2 The testimony, e. g., concerning the sanity of a
man, may have been delivered in a hypothetical case. Not every
deviation of the evidence in the second case, from that assumed
in the question, will render the evidence inadmissible. The
former testimony is not made irrelevant by the fact simply that
new and unexpected matters have been introduced at the second
trial, upon which no cross-examination of the witneps was conducted in the earlier trial. The former testimony is receivable, if
the facts assumed in the hypothetical question might fairly be
found to exist, by the jury at the second trial, without necessity
to find other facts which would make the inferences of the witness
palpably baseless."
'Jones v. Wood, 16 Pa. 25.
'Gould v. Crawford, 2 Pa. 89.

'Thornton v. Britton, 144 Pa. 126.

Evidence on the subject of

profits, taken in the trial of the previous ejectment.

4Rothrock v. Gallaher, 91 Pa. 108.
5
Haupt v. Henninger, 37 Pa. 138.
'Corn. Title Co. v. Gray, 150 Pa. 255.
7
Perrin v. Wells, 155 Pa. 299.
8Knights of Pythias v. Leadbeter, 2 Super. 461.
'Ballman v. Heron, 169 Pa. 510.
10 3Brown v. Com., 73 Pa., 321; Com. v. Cleary, 148 Pa. 26; Com. v.
Keck, 148 Pa. 639; Com. v. Lenousky, 206 Pa. 277. The defendant may
use this former testimony, no less than the Commonwealth; MoLain v.
Corn., 99 Pa. 86.

"1Greenan v. Eggeling, 30 Super. 253.
"Becker v. Philadelphia, 217 Pa. 344.

"First Nat. Bank v. Wirebaoh, 106 Pa. 37

126

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SIMILARITY OF THE EARLIER WITH THE LATER
PROCEDURE
It is not necessary that the first and second proceedings
should be similar in form, or have similar objects. It is enough
if they are between the same parties, and if the subject-matter of
the testimony in one is relevant to the other. Testimony in replevin may be used in a following assumpsit,' in ejectment in a
following action of covenant, 2 in account render in a following
assumpsit,8 in a bill in equity in a following ejectment," in
assumpsit in a following distribution proceeding in the Orphans'
Court.5
PROOF OF THE FORMER TESTIMONY
The former evidence may have been recently given. It may
have been brief; have dealt with one or two subjects only, so
that the remembrance of it by one who heard it is not impracticable. But whether recent and brief and simple, or not, any
person who heard it, and will say that he remembers it, may
prove its contents.'
It is not necessary that the "very words" of
the witness should be proved, as was assumed to be the case in
England. To require proof of the words would, unless they had
been reduced to writing at the time, exclude oral evidence altogether.'
The memory being so frail, the truth of the statement
of one who undertakes, after a lapse of a considerable time, to
The
give the very words of the witness, may well be doubted.'
witness must be able to give the substance of all the testimony
bearing upon the point in issue, not only of the testimony in
If he says he recollects
chief, but of that on cross-examination.
'Wright v. Cumpsty, 4.1 Pa. 102.
2
Jones v. Wood, 16 Pa. 25.
3
Fvans v. Reed, 78 Pa. 415.
4
Land Co. v. Weidner, 169 Pa. 359.
5
fDunlevy's Estate, 10 C. C. 454.
OWalbridge v. Knipper, 96 Pa. 48; Magill v. Kauffman, 4 S. & R.
317; Wolf V. Wyeth, 11 S. & R. 149. The witness testified that the absent witness had said that he had mailed an application for insurance
within a day or two of the time it was made and directed it to the secretary of the fire insurance company. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 23 Pa. 72.
7
Wolf v. Wyeth, 11 S. & R. 149; Chess v. Chess, 17 S. & R. 409;
Gould v. Crawford, 2 Pa. 89.
Moore v. Pearson, 6 W. & S. 51; Cornell v. Green, 10 S. & R. 14.
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that there was a cross-examination, but cannot remember what
questions were put, but, if the questions put were repeated, he
could likely recollect some of, them, the evidence of the testimony
should be wholly excluded. "If there was a cross-examination,"
says Duncan, J., "the witness should be prepared to state what
that was, for the cross-examination might have explained what
he swore to on the direct examination.' ' 1 A put into writing
what his evidence would be concerning the testimony of the deceased witness. He stated that the writing was all that he'could
recollect of what Mr. Hopkins said on his examination in chief.
This required the rejection of the witness, because he was ready
to give only the testimony on the direct examination.' In order
to prove that a receipt was not signed by the person whose name
was appended to it, a witness was called who testified that at the
time of the alleged signing the person whose name was signed
was at another place. He knew this because, being at that other
place, he shod the horse of this person, who brought it to him.
At a later trial a witness testifying to X's testimony, said that X
had his day book open when he was giving his testimony. He
could not say that X relied on the book, and not on his memory.
He could not remember that X undertook to speak of any date
independently of the book. This testimony concerning what X
testified was properly received, although X's book was not produced.' It must not be overlooked that the act of May 23 d,
1887, P. L. 158, seems to confine the mode of proving former
evidence, which is to be used as evidence of the facts in issue, to
"notes" (Sect. 3), "properly proven notes" (Sect. 9).
PROOF BY NOTES-NOTES

OF COUNSEL

Independently of statute, notes of evidence, taken at the time
of the delivery of it, by any one, could, when properly proved to
be correct, be used to prove the content of the evidence. The
notes were formerly taken by counsel or the judge. The notes
may be in characters which the ordinary person cannot translate,
or they may be otherwise unintelligible. Although they might be
'Watson v. Gilday, 11 S. & R. 337.
Wolf v. Wyeth, 11 S. & R. 149.

2
3

Cox v. Norton, 1 P. & W. 412. What X had said, says Huston, J.,
was to be proved, not why he said so; not the ground of his belief.
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used to refresh the memory of the person who took them,' and
although, his memory thus refreshed, he might testify to the
former evidence, such notes themselves will be inadmissible.
Notes consisting of abbreviations, short abstracts of sentences,
prepositions, adverbs and conjunctions omitted, impersonal verbs
much used, verbs without nominatives, nouns without verbs, and
therefore of uncertain meaning, or totally unintelligible to strangers, must be excluded.' When the notes are intelligible and
are sworn to be full and accurate, they may be received. 3 They
do -not need to contain the very words of the witness. It is not
necessary that the counsel who proves the notes should, in order
to justify the admission of them, have any recollection of the testimony. It is enough that he believes that the notes contain
substantially all that the witness testified.'
NOTES OF THE TRIAL JUDGE

It was formerly, before the employment of court stenographers, the habit of judges to take notes of the testimony delivered
in a cause. It was no part of their official duty,' however, to
take these notes. They did not usually take down everything
that the witness said. Generally they took down what of the testimony they deemed material, they condensed it, put it in their
own language. 6 These notes therefore .could not be put in
evidence until the judge who took them swore to their complete'In Lightner v. Wike, 4 S. & R. 203, Tilghman, C. J., seems to think
that the notes could not be used as evidence, but merely to refresh the
memory of the person who took Them, a manifestly erroneous view.

Notes were used in Jones v. Wood, 16 Pa. 25; R. R. Co. v. Spearen, 47
Pa. 300.
2Huidekoper v. Cotton, 3 W. 56.
3Moore v. Pearson, 6 W. & S. 51; R. R. Co. v. Spearen, 47 Pa. 300;
Cornell.v. Green, 10 S. & R. 14; Chess v. Chess, 17 S. & R. 409; Rhine
v. Robinson, 27 Pa. 30; Jackson v. Ferris, 5 Sadler 302; Covanhoven v.
Hart, 21 Pa. 495; Hocker v. Jamison, 2 W. & S. 438; Brown v. Com., 73

Pa. 321; Flanagin v. Leibert, Bright. N. P. 61; Towers v. Hagner, 3
Wh. 48; McAdams' Exec. v. Stilwell. 13 Pa. 90.
4

Moore v. Pearson, 6 W. & S. 51; Rhine v. Robinson, 27 Pa.
5Miles v. O'Hara, 4 Binn. 108; Livingston v. Cox, 8 W. & S.
OMiles v. O'Hara, 4 Binn. 108. A copy of the notes was not
able in evidence until explanation on oath of the non-production
original.

30.
61.
receivof the
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ness and accuracy.' This proved, the notes would be independent evidence. Possibly the notes though not complete might
be used by the judge to assist his memory, he thereby becoming
able to detail the evidence.' The party to be adversely affected
by the evidence might agree that the judge's notes of testimony
should be put in, without his oath as to their fullness and accuracy,' and the notes without the oath could theni be receivable." The judge's death'does not dispense with proof of the accuracy of his notes.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS

Notes of testimony may be incorporated into the record by a
bill of exceptions, but, even when thus incorporated, the record
is evidence that the testimony was delivered, only for the purposes of review in the appellate court, not to prove in a later trial
that the testimony was delivered.' Says Day, C. J., of the Ohio
Supreme Court, quoted by Mestrez at J., "the bill of exceptions was
taken under the statute for a specific purpose in that trial and imports verity no further than the statutory purpose for which it
was authorized. It was never intended to be used as evidence in
a subsequent trial of the case, of what was the testimony of the
witnesses on the trial in which it was taken. Whenever it becomes competent to show, on a subsequent trial of the case, -what
tesfimony was given on a former trial, the usual modes of proof
cannot be dispensed with by resort to the bill of exceptions taken
for no such purpose. '
NOTES OF THE COURT STENOGRAPHER

If the notes of counsel or of the trial judge are a proper in'4 Binn. 108, Livingston v. Cox, 8 W. & S. 61.

2Leather v. Poultney, 4 Binn. 352.
'It was very common to do so, said Tilghman, C., J., in 1811; Miles
v. O'Hara, 4 Binn. 108.
4
Wright v. Cumpsty, 41 Pa. 102. The notes were of the judge who
was presiding at the second trial.
'Livingston v. Cox, 8 W. & S. 61.
'Edwards v. Gimbel, 202 Pa. 30. The effort here was to show that
the witness had previously given inconsistent evidence. In Parker v.
Donaldson, 6 W. & S. 132, the record of the former trial was used to

show that the witness was inconsistent with himself, but no objection
was made.

Cf. McDermott v. Hoffman, 70 Pa. 31, 52.
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strument for proving the content of the former testimony, the
verbatim notes of a stenographer, or the stenographer's translation therefrom, either in ordinary script or oral, are an eligible
proof. Apparently, the stenographer must swear to the correctness
of his notes and of his reading from or copy of them. Otherwise
they are not the "properly proven notes of the examination,"
Possibly the notes
which the Act of May 2 3 d, 1887, demands.'
without the suppletory oath of the stenographer will be received,
when the party to be affected does not question their correctness. 2
The copy of his notes, which he files with the record, should be
produced, but if it cannot be found, a carbon copy, proven by the
stenographer to have been taken at the same time, may be
used.' If no copy from the original notes has been made, the
stenographer may read the original notes to the jury.4
NOTES OF CORONER
Testimony before a coroner may be desired to be used in a
subsequent civil action, either as substantive evidetce in the absence of the witness, or for the purpose of weakening the testimony delivered by the witness in that action, by showing its inconsistency with the earlier testimony. But the coroner's certified notes are not evidence of the testimony delivered before him,
unless it appears that his inquest has found murder or manslaughter. If that does not appear, the coroner's oath as a witness, to the accuracy of his notes, would be necessary. 5
TESTIMONY USED AS AN ADMISSION
The testimony of a witness in one proceeding may be used
against him as an admission of the fact sworn to, in a later proceeding, in which he is a party. 6 Several persons are on trial for
1

Smith v. Hine, 179 Pa. 203. Cf. Molloy v. U. S. Express Co.,
22 Super. 173; Com. v. Doughty, 139 Pa. 383. The stenographer was
in Brennan v. Jacobs, 1 Mona. 213; 22 W. N. 453.
sworn
2
Giberson v. Patterson Mills Co., 187 Pa. 513. Notes of testimony
were used in Pratt v. Patterson, 81 Pa. 114; Com. v. Cleary, 148 Pa. 26;
Dunlevy's Estate, 10 C. C. 454; Poundstone v. Jones, 182 Pa. 574.
3
Molloy v. U. S. Zxpress Co., 22 Super. 173.
4
Knights of Pythias v. Leadbeter, 2 Super. 461; Smith v. Hine, 179
Pa. 5203.
Bdwards v. Gimbel, 202 Pa. 30.
OAnderson v. Snyder, 14 Super. 424.
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conspiracy. Three of them have testified in a previous case. The
cohimonwealth may prove this testimony as in the nature of an
admission. Says Paxson, J., "Their admissions or declarations
would be evidence against them, to show their share in a conspiracy; and, if so, why not their testimony under oath?" 1 The
testimony of the defendant in one trial may be used against him
in a subsequent trial upon the same indictment even if he elects
not to become a witness at that trial.' Testimony given under
the act of July I2th, 1842, which abolishes imprisonment for-debt,
may not, says the 22nd section of that act, be used in any "other
suit or prosecution," e. g., in a subsequent ejectment.'
WHEN WITNESS IS PRESENT AND COMPETENT

Ordinarily, when the person who formerly testified is present
at the later trial, 4 or his presence could have been secured,'
and he is competent, the former testimony cannot be used as
substantive evidence of the matters averred in it. Notes of the
testimony of witnesses taken by an examiner. In a subsequent
settlement of the account of the executor of an estate, in the
Orphan's Court of Philadelphia, these notes were not receivable,
instead of the testimony newly given, of the witnesses who were
still living and within the court's jurisdiction.' If the opposite party excludes a witness on the incorrect ground that he is
incompetent by something that has occurred since he delivered
bis testimony in the earlier proceeding, le will be estopped from
objecting in the Supreme Court, to the admission of the former
testimony on the ground that the witness was in fact competent.'
If the witness is not present, and the plaintiff uses his deposition,
'Com. v. Doughty, 139 Pa. 383.

'Com. v. House, 6 Super. 92. The voluntary testimony of the defendant called by the plaintiff is receivable to affect him; Miller v.
McCool, 3 Kulp, 317.
3Uhler v. Maulfair, 23 Pa. 481.

'Merriman v. McManus, 102 Pa. 102.
'Richardson v. Stewart, 2 S. & R. 83.

The witness living, and "for

anything that appeared within the jurisdiction of the court," Tilghman,

C. J., says he should have been brought into court "or his deposition
should have been taken."
PLafferty's Estate, 184 Pa. 502; Huidekoper v. Cotton, 3 W. 56.
7 Merriman v. McManus, 102 Pa. 102.
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the defendant may employ his former testimony, not merely to
contradict him, but to prove facts not touched upon in the deposition.'
USE OF NOTES TO REFRESH RECOLLECTION
OF WITNESS

In Rothrock v. Gallaher, 2 a witness 87 years old, whose
memory had failed him, was allowed to hear his testimony on a
former occasion read to him, and then to say that, although he
had forgotten that he had so testified, if he did so testify, the testimony was true. In a later case, a witness 68 years old, being
asked concerning the condition of buildings on the premises in
dispute at a former time, said he did not remember the time when
a certain addition was put to the log house. He did remember
that he had testified as to the matter in a former proceeding before
arbitrators. Counsel then offered to read to him what he had
said on that occasion, first authenticating the notes of evidence.
Justifying the exclusion of this offer, Gordon, J., says, the principle of Rothrock v. Gallaher cannot be extended to the case of
a witness of ordinary health and memory. There was no evidence
that the witness had, in the interval3 between the arbitration and
trial, by old age or otherwise, lost his memory. "He but failed
to recollect what he had previously sworn to, but, if this were
enough to admit the notes of a former trial, we might as well
abandon original testimony altogether and supply it with previous
notes and depositions. It would certainly be an excellent way to
avoid the contradiction of a doubtful witness, for he could always
be thus led to the exact words of his former evidence." 4
1
Parker v. Donaldson, 6 W. & S. 132.
291 Pa. 108.
3
The length of this interval does not appear.
4
Velott v. Lewis, 102 Pa. 326. Cf. Smith v. Summerhill, 21 York
132, where the suggestion is made that if the first testimony was delivered very shortly after the event, notes of it might be used when the
second testimony was delivered long after the event. Cf. also, Putnam
v. United States, 162 U. S. 687. Before arbitrators a witness testified

as to articles destroyed by a fire. Counsel for defendant (a fire insurance company) took down the list of the articles. At the trial, before
the jury, the company called this witness, and he stated that he had
given an account of the things lost in the fire before the arbitrators;
that he had spoken from recollection. The court refused properly to

allow the defeneant to ask whether the list made by counsel was a correct statement of the items of loss mentioned by him in his testimony
before the arbitrators. (a) The question was not permissible for the
purpose of discrediting the witness of the defendant. No attempt was

made to use the list as a memorandum to refresh the witness' recollection. (b) The paper could not have been received in evidence even if
the witness had said that it was correct. Ins. Co. v. Updegraff, 43 Pa.
350.
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SHOWING PREVIOUS INCONSISTENT CLAIM
It is proper to show that the present claim of a plaintiff is
inconsistent with a past claim, by showing what witnesses for him
testified in the earlier case. A sues the city of Philadelphia for
personal injuries; a uterine disturbance caused by an accident. Defendant attempts to show that this disturbance was due to a former
accident, for the injuries suffered from which she had sued. A physician had testified for her, that she was suffering from uterine
trouble, caused by the accident, and A had recovered a verdict
based on this testimony. The testimony of this physician can be
shown to contradict the present claim of the plaintiff that the
uterine disorder was due to the late accident. 1
CONTRADICTION OF A WITNESS BY FORMER
TESTIMONY
The force of the testimony of a witness is weakened by showing that he has made statements inconsistent with those which he
is making as a witness. These statements may have been made
on the street without any solemnity, 2 or they may have been
made carefully and under circumstances which appeal strongly
to the duty to tell the truth. They may have been made as a
witness in a preceding trial or investigation. The object of
showing these former declarations may be not merely to reveal
complete and explicit contradiction, but also to show that on the
former trial, when, had he believed that a 6ertain thing had been
said or done, he would probably have mentioned it, he did not
mention it.' The action was for negligence or want of skill of a
physician. A witness for the plaintiff testified that the physician,
the defendant, changed the position of the plaintiff's broken leg
about six weeks after it had been set. It was proved that the
witness, on a former trial, had testified to the physician's neglect,
but had said nothing about the changing of the position of the
leg.' A witness saying that from his knowledge of tobacco, the
'Becker v. Philadelphia, 217 Pa. 345.
'If the hand writing of a deceased subscribing witness of a will is
proved as a tacit declaration by him that the testator was sane, it may
be shown that he has declared that the testator was insane when he
made the will. Harden v. Hays, 9 Pa. 151.
'Bemus v. Howard, 3 W. 255; McAteer v. McMullen, 2 Pa. 324.
'Id.
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plaintiff's tobacco was "not quite" merchantable, his testimony
at a former trial was competent, to lessen the force of his present
testimony by showing that he did not have a clear view as to what
is merchantable tobacco. 1
WHERE FORMER TESTIMONY DELIVERED

It matters little in what proceeding the former testimony was
delivered. It may have occurred in a former jury trial of the
same action, 2 in an investigation before a coroner,' in a proceeding in equity, the present testimony being given in an action at
law,' in a trial before arbitrators, ' in the probate of a will before
the register; the evidence being used in the trial of a feigned issue
to determine the validity of the will,' in an ejectment, turning on
the testamentary capacity of the maker of a will, the witness
affirming this capacity, but in the later ejectment denying it,"
in a prosecution for larceny, the evidence being used in a later
action for false imprisonment,8 in an inquiry by an examiner appointed by the Orphan's Court to determine whether an issue
devisavil vel non should be awarded. His notes of testimony may
be used in the trial of the issue. 9
CONTRADICTION MUST BE PERMISSIBLE

When evidence is improperly brought out in cross-examination, not being germane to the cause, and being elicited for the
purpose of contradicting it by former testimony, the contradiction
by the former testimony, or otherwise, is not allowable. 1"
HOW PROVE THE CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE

The witness may be cross-examined as to his having given,
'Field v. Schuster, 26 Super. 82.
2
Field v. Schuster, 26 Super. 82; Parker v. Donaldson, 6 W. & S. 132.
8Edwards v. Gimbel, 202 Pa. 30.
Rudy v. Myton, 19 Super. 312.
5
Wilhelm v. Cornell, 3 Gr. 178; Smith v. Price, 8 W. 447.
'Cowden v. Reynolds, 12 S. & R. 281. At the trial the witness said

the testator was too intoxicated to make a will. Before the register he
had said that the testator was of sound mind:
7Harden v. Hays, 9 Pa, 151.
8
Butler v. Stockdale, 19 Super. 98.
9
Stokes v. Miller, 10 W. N. 24-1.
1
°Com. v. Scouton, 20 Super. 503.
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on a former occasion, contradictory testimony, 1 or made contradictory declarations. If he admits delivering the testimony, his
inconsistency is revealed. If he does not, proof by witnesses who
heard him testify of what he said may be given,' and notes of
the testimony may be used 3 as when the object is to use it, not
for contradiction, but as substantive evidence. The notes of the
trial judge, properly proved, may be used,' but they must be
proved by him or another' to be accurate, nor does his death dispense with this proof.'

The act of May 23, 1887, P. L. 158,

makes a distinction between the former testimony which is used
as independent evidence and that which is used for contradiction,
requiring the former to be proved by properly proven notes, and
permitting the latter to be "orally proved." The notes cannot
be proved by the fact that they are embraced in a bill of exceptions,
sealed by the trial judge,' nor are the notes of a coroner made
evidence by his certificate, when the inquest has not resulted in
a finding of murder or manslaughter.'
WHOLE EVIDENCE TO BE GIVEN

When a part of the evidence previously given is offered to
lessen the credit of a witness, the party who is interested in supporting his credit may put in evidence the entire testimony respecting the subject concerning which the discrepancy is alleged
to exist. "The effect of a witness's testimony is to be gathered
from all that he says, and it would be unjust to subject a witness to
1
Harden v. Hays, 9 Pa. 151; Bank of Northern Liberties v. Davis,
6W. & S. 285.
2Harden v. Hays, 9 Pa. 151; Foster v. Shaw, 7 S. & R. 156; Bemus
v. Howard, 3 W. 255. The registei swore to testimony delivered before
him, in Cowden v. Reynolds, 12 S. & R. 281.
3
Wilhelm v. Cornell, 3 Gr. 178. The stenographer's notes were used
in Butler v. Stockdale, 19 Super. 98. In Com. v. Scouton, 20 Super. 503,
the notes of the stenographer, filed in the case, were produced with his
official certificate, he not being present, nor swearing to their accuracy.
The trial court admitted them. The superior court thought the proof
of contradiction, in whatever mode, was not admissible.
"Schall v. Miller, 5 Wh. 156.
5
Livingston v. Cox, 8 W. & S. 61.
6Foster v. Shaw, 7 S. & R. 156.
7
Parker v. Donaldson, 6 W. & S. 132.
8
Com. v. Scouton, 20 Super. 503.
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suspicion," says, Porter (W. D.), J., "by showing a part of what
he had said on a former occasion and excluding the explanation
which he then gave." 1 The plaintiff having, in order to discredit
a witness for the defendant, read from the notes of evidence taken
before arbitrators, a part of the cross-examination, the defendant
may read other portions of the witness's testimony given upon his
re-examination. 2 But, the giving of evidence of that part of the
former testimony, which contradicts the present testimony, is no
warrant for the party who is offering the witness to produce to
the jury all the former testimony, even thdt part of it in respect
to which no contradiction is alleged.'
WHEN WITNESS IS NOT A PARTY

The rule was formerly laid down that a witness could not be
contradicted by proof of his own previous inconsistent statements,
unless he were first questioned about such statements, in order
that he might deny or admit the making of them, or explain them
consistently with his present testimony.' The principle now
recognized is that whether the witness shall be thus given an opportunity to deny or explain the imputed inconsistent statement
must be left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Unless
the discretion is abused, there is no ground for reversal. 5 When
the witness testifies by deposition taken before the trial and at a
distance, the party to be affected adversely by his testimony may
not be aware, when it is delivered, of the inconsistent statements.
He will be allowed to prove these, therefore, at the trial, although
he did not question the deposing witness concerning them.' A
witness is found under examination at the trial to be mentally
incompetent. His deposition previously taken is then admitted.
The opposite party may show statements made by him since the
taking of the deposition, inconsistent therewith, although he has
IRudy v. Myton, 19 Super. 312.
'Wilhelm v. Cornell, 3 Gr. 178.
3
Stokes v. Miller, 10 W. N. 241.

'McAteer v. McMullen, 2 Pa. 32; Wertz v. May, 21 Pa. 274; Wright
v. Cumpsty, 41 Pa. 102.
'Rothrock v. Gallaher, 91 Pa. 108; Shannon v. Castner, 21 Super.
294. Yet the rule is spoken of as "well settled" in Brubaker v. Taylor,
76 Pa. 83.
6
Rothrock v. Gallaher, 91 Pa. 108; Walden v. Finch, 70 Pa. 460.
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not been questioned concerning them. He could not have been
asked concerning them at the taking of the deposition, for they
had not then been made. He could not be asked concerning them
at the trial, for he is then non compes menlis.' If the court refuses to continue a case, because of the absence of a material
witness for the defendant, when the plaintiff admits that, if present, the witness would swear as the defendant alleges that he would,
the plaintiff may prove contradictory statements made by the
absent witness, although he has not been questioned concerning
them. 2
USE OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES TO CONTRADICT

In Butler v. Stockdale,3 a trial for assault and battery and
false imprisonment, the stenographer's notes of the evidence of a
witness in a former trial were read to contradict him. The notes
were not shown to him, nor read to him; his attention to the
manner in which he had testified was called only in a "general
way." No error was committed in receiving the former testimony.
Beaver, J., observes that the witnesses were asked on cross-examination in a general way about theit former testimony. Their attention was called to particular parts of that testimony relating to
specific facts. They were not shown the notes; were not particularly interrogated as to the answers to specific questions. The
defendant did not request that this should be done. It was proper
to contradict their testimony as to particular facts by reading so
much of the stenographer's notes as contradicted the testimony
in chief.
USE OF THE CONTRADICTION

The former testimony of a witness cannot be used, the wit"Shannon v. Castner, 21 Super. 294.

The witness' leaving the court

house without permission during the trial would justify allowing proof

in his absence of his prior contradictory statements.
'Baldi v. Ins. Co., 18 Super. 599. The rule requiring that an op-,
portunity be given to the witness to explain or deny the contradiction,
is said by Rice, P. J., to be based largely on a regard for the witness
himself. But he should not be spared at the cost of the interest of the
party. Justice to the witness dictates the rule. Bank of Northern
Liberties v. Davis, 6 W. & S. 285. Plaintiff having used the deposition
of a witness, defendant may show that he contradicted himself in his
testimony in an earlier trial. Parker v. Donaldson, 6 W. & S. 132.

319 Super. 98.
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ness being present and testifying, as "independent proof."' It
simply exposes the inconsistency of the witness and so reduces
the credit which may be attached to his present testimony. When
the witness is a party, proof of his self-contradiction has this
function, it is true, but his prior statements are in the nature of
admissions,' and they are "evidence of themselves."'
WHEN THE WITNESS IS A PARTY

When a party becomes a witness, it is not necessary, as a preliminary to the exposure of his prior declarations, under oath or
not, which are inconsistent with his present testimony, to call his
attention to these earlier declarations.' The reasons assigned for
the distinction between party and non-party is not entirely satisfactory. If the proof of the contradictory statement of the party
not only lessens his credit as a witness, but acts as substantive
evidence against him, the reason for apprising him of the intention to prove the statement, and for giving him a chance to deny
or explain, is weightier than if the result would be merely to
weaken his testimony. If, as some cases suggest, the object of
the notice is to protect the witness from humiliation, and the
disparagement of his credit in the community, the party deserves
as much consideration of this sort as the mere witness. A reason
for making the distinction might be that the party is under a duty
to remain throughout the trial and the witness not, and the witness may therefore have left the court house without suspecting
that an effort would be made to assail his consistency. At all
events, notice should be given to a witness before he leaves that
an effort will be made to show that he has contradicted himself.
'Cowden v. Reynolds, 12 S. & R. 281; Smith v. Price, 8 W. 447.
2Kreiter v. Bomberger, 82 Pa. 79.
3Brubaker v. Taylor, 76 Pa. 83.
4Brubaker v. Taylor, 76 Pa. 83; Kreiter v. Bomberger, 82 Pa. 59.
Cf. Butler v. Stockdale, 19 Super. 98; Cronkrite v. Trexler, 187 Pa. 100.
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MOOT COURT
WILLIAM HOLBEIN v. R. R. CO. AND
ETC., STOCKHOLDERS

A, B, C,

Corporations-Statute of Limitations
STATFEMXNT OF' FACTS
A subscribed for 20 shares of the stock of the defendant company.
He paid 107 of its par, which was $100 per share. The rest was
to be paid on call of the directors. Four calls were made, and A paid
the amounts called. Two years elapsed, when the corporation being
insolvent, made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, June 17,1906.
Holbein is a creditor. He unites with the assignee in a bill, filed July 7,
1912, to compel the stockholders to pay so much of their unpaid stock
subscriptions, payment of which would enable the creditor to be paid in
full.
Miller for Plaintiff.
Myers for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE C0URT
PZPPETS, J.-The preliminary question is as to the jurisdiction
in equity. That this is a proper case for equitable jurisdiction is well
settled and needs no discussion. Cook v. Carpenter, 212 Pa. 165; Gray
v. Citizens Gas Co., 206 Pa. 303; Newton's Estate, 46 Super. 40.
The remaining question, the substantial issue in the case, concerns
the statute of limitations. A court of equity in a suit to enforce payment of a subscription to the capital stock of a corporation, acts out of
analogy to the statute of limitations. Railway v. Graham, 36 Pa. 77;
Swearingen v. Dairy Co., 198 Pa. 68; Cook v. Carpenter, 212 Pa. 165;
Newton's Estate, 46 Pa., Super. 40.
The statute begins to run from the time the right of action accrues.
When did plaintiff's right of action accrue in this case? If corporation
had been solvent and doing business in the ordinary way, the statute
would not begin to run until call had been made (according to terms of
subscription); but the company became insolvent and made an assignment for the benefit of creditors. Is this equivalent to a call and does
it set the statute running?. If so, the assignment being made June 17,
1906, and the action begun July 7, 1912, more than six years elapsed and
the action is barred.
An early case upon this subject is Franklin Savings Bank v.
Bridges, 20 W. N. C. 43. Syllabus of that case is that sixyears is a bar
to an action by a corporation on a subscription when no call or assessment has been made in that time. But there the corporation had been
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insolvent for more than six years, and the decision was put explicitly
on that ground which is now well settled.
The above case was expressly followed in Swearingen v. Sewickley
Dairy Co., Supra. That was a bill in equity by creditors against a corporation and its stockholders to enforce payment of an alleged balance
due on stock subscriptions. Company became insolvent and made an
assignment for the benefit of creditors on Jan. 5, 1891, and bill was
filed June 30, 1899. The Court, thru Justice Mitchell, held that the bill
was too late. "The right of action of the plaintiff, whatever it was,
accrued upon the fact of insolvency of the dairy company shown by the
assignment for the benefit of creditors, and statute of limitations began
to run from that date."
Cook v. Carpenter, Supra., was a similar action to recover unpaid
subscriptions. In this case a period greater than six years elapsed
between time when last call was made and the present action for the
balance of the subscription. But only two years had passed since the
corporation became insolvent and made the assignment. The Court
held that the action was not barred by the statute of limitations because
the right to make calls for payment of subscriptions could not be barred
by the statute, saying, "The duty of payment is only a reserve duty for
possible contingencies, and until they happen, either by calls by the
corporation on the subscription, or by the rights of creditors,there is no
duty of the subscribers to piy, no right of action against him for nonpayment and no starting point forthe statute." The opinion discussed
the doctrine of Swearingen v. Dairy Co., Supra., and affirmed it, but
distinguished the facts of the case then decided.
Counsel for the plaintiff argues that until the corporate indebtedness
is ascertained and proportionate amount due from each stockholder to
pay that indebtedness is known, no cause of action accrues, and the
statute of limitations does not begin to run, and that liability of the
stockholders in this case is not definite and ascertained. He cites
Schofield v. Turner, 213 Pa. 548. That case was a suit by a receiver of
a mutual insurance association against a member for payment of an
assessment. The Court held that the statute of limitations began to
run against his liability to pay assessments from the date of decree of
the Court authorizing the assessment and not from the date of insolvency of the company.
But the Court in deciding the case expressly distinguished it from
Swearingen v. Dairy Co., Supra. It said, "There is a difference between
the liability of a member of a mutual insurance company and the holder
of capital stock in a corporation on his unpaid subscription. The stockholder during solvency of a corporation can be called upon at any time
by the board of directors to pay the balance due on his stock. His
liability is fixed and definite and enforceable upon insolvency. While
a member of the mutual insurance association makes no unconditional
promise to pay, but only such sum or sums as may be assessed against
him as his portion required for the necessities or losses of his company."
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So that Swearingen v. Dairy Co. controls in which Justice Mitchell
said, "So long as the corporation is solvent, the whole subscription is
due in accordance with its terms and is payable when and as called for
by the corporation. But when the corporation becomes insolvent, the
contract between it and the subscriber is terminated and his debt to it
then is only for such part of his subscription as is required to pay the
corporate debts. It is a debt not to it in its own right, but in the right
of its creditors. But it would seem that the status of the stockholders,
as holder of the fund, at least contingently to the creditors, must be
fixed at the time and by the fact of the ascertainment of insolvency.
It is a general rule that insolvency fixes the relative rights of all the
parties concerned. From that moment the unpaid subscription become
part of the assets for payment of the creditors. It is true they are
special or as they may be called reserved assets not to be put in distribution until the insufficiency of the other assets is shown, but this
is no reason why the creditors may not proceed at once to show the fact."
It is our opinion that when the railroad company admitted its insolvency and executed a deed of assignment for the benefit of its creditors, every stockholder knew that the balance of his unpaid subscription-a fixed sum-might be needed for the paymeut of the company's
debts, and the assignee and creditors knew that the balance was due.
With the liability thus fixed and the right to enforce it established, the
statute of limitations began to run from the time of insolvency.
Therefore, Halbein was guilty of laches and his right of action
barred by the lapse of over six years. The bill is hereby dismissed at
the costs of the complainant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
It was originally held in Pennsylvania that where a subscriber
promised to pay for stock upon call, the statute of limitationg did not
begin to run until the call was made. Sinkler v. Co., 3 P. & W. 149.
Later, however, it was held that where the corporation did not
make calls until after six years from the date of subscription, an action
for the amount of such calls was barred. This holding was at first
based upon a presumption, "by analogy to the statute of limitations,"
that after six years without calls the enterprise was abandoned, but, in
course of time, the "presumption by analogy" was discarded and the
statute of limitations was held to apply directly. R. R. Co. v. Byers,
32 Pa. 22; McCully v. R. R., 32 Pa. 25; R. R. v. Graham, 36 Pa. 77.
In a later case it was said that "these decisions have not commanded uniform assent, and it must be confessed that they are not easy to
reconcile with the cases that hold that a call is not a necessary foundation for a suit against a stockholder." Swearingen v. Dairy Co., 198
Pa. 68.
Finally, the cases thus criticised were overruled by the Supreme
Court, which held that the statute did not begin to run until a call was
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made and that it was not necessary that such call should be made within six years from the date of subscription. Cook v. Carpenter, 212 Pa.
165.
Previous to the decision in Cook v. Carpenter it had been decided
that an action against a stockholder of an in.solvent corporation for an
unpaid stock subscription must be brought within six years after the
insolvency of the corporation. Swearingen v. Dairy Co., 198 Pa. 68,
and in a case decided after the decision in Cook v. Carpenter this doctrine was approved and followed. Newton's Est., 46 Super. 40.
These cases are determinative of the present case, unless, as contended by the counsel for the plaintiffs, the doctrine enunciated therein is applicable only where the payment of the whole of the unpaid subscriptions is necessary to liquidate the indebtness of the company.
We have discovered nothing in either of the cases which give color
for such a contention, and that such a qualification was not intended
is clearly indicated in Schofield v. Turner, 213 Pa. 548, where the Court,
speaking of Swearingen v. Dairy Co., said, "When the company admitted its insolvency and executed a deed of assignment for the benefit
of creditors, every stockholder knew that the balance of his subscription-a fixed sum-might be needed and the assignee knew that the
balance was due. With the liability thus fixed and the right to enforce
it thus established, the statute began to run from the time of insolvency."
Furthermore, in Swearingen v. Dairy Co., the Court said, "All the
cases say that on a creditor's bill an account must be taken of the debts,
assets and unpaid subscriptions in order to determine how much of the
latter should be called," and "the right of action of the plaintiff [assignee], whatever it was, accrued upon the fact of insolvency and the
statute of limitations began to run from that date.
Affirmed.
ARTHUR GRANT v.

JAMES CHENEY

Specific Performance-Option Contract
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Cheney owned a rare coin. In consideration of fifty cents paid to
him by Grant he gave the latter an option to purchase the coin for $35
within 30 days. Later Cheney notified Grant that he revoked his offer.
Grant immediately and within the thirty days tendered the $35 to Cheney,
who refused to deliver the coin. Grant files this bill in equity to compel
Cheney to sell him the coin.
McCall for Plaintiff.
Rickles for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
MYERS, J.-The act of June 16, 1836, P. L4. 784 (amended by act
Feb. 14, 1857) provides, "The several courts of Common Pleas shall have
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the jurisdiction and powers of a court of Chancery, so far as relates to
affording of specific relief when a recovery in damages would be
an inadequate remedy."
If this contract had been simply a contract for the sale of a rare or
unique coin it would have been enforceable under the provisions of the
statute, supra. For a recovery in damages clearly would be an inadequate remedy. Many cases are to be found directly in point, viz., Ralsten v. Ilmsen, 204 Pa. 588; Beasley v. Allyn (wooden bowl, trophy), 15
Phila. 97; McGovern v. Remington (surveyor's maps), 12 Pa. 56; Schraff
v. Walter (key to safe deposit box), 61 N. J. Eq. 476; Somerset v. Cookson (alter-piece), 3 Pr. Wins. 390; Dowling v. Betjemann (picture), 2 J.
& H. 544.
But this was an option contract. An option has been defined as "a
promise to keep an offer open for a specified time." Clark on Contracts,
p 33. It was suggested on argument that the contract to keep open the
offer, tho binding upon the promiser, was, like most contracts, capable
of being broken by the promiser and leaving to the promisee his remedy
at law for damages for the breach. If the contract to keep the offer
open could be and was broken the offer must have been withdrawn thereby. And the plaintiff, not having accepted the offer before its withdrawal, there is no contract here for the sale of the coin. Hence this
suit for specific performance must be dismissed.
We admit the logic of this argument, but hesitate to adopt it. The
rule stated by many text-writers and in the cases is thus laid down in
Clark on Contracts, p 33, "If the promise to keep the offer open for a
specified time is supported by a valid consideration-as where money
is paid or promised for the option or refusal-the promise constitutes a
contract in itself, and, of course, is binding. A failure to keep the offer
open would be a breach of contract, for which an action for damages
would lie, or, upon acceptance, a suit for specific performance." In 9
Cyc. 287, this question has been discussed thus: "It has been suggested
that there can be no meeting of minds by an acceptance after the offer
has been withdrawn and the revocation communicated to the offeree;
that there can therefore be no contract of sale which can be enforced,
but, that the offerer is simply liable in damages for the breach of his
agreement tu keep the offer open. But the correct view would seem to
be that where the offer is made under seal or is founded on a consideration, it has become more than an offer; it has become a promise upon
condition. And a promise cannot be revoked without the consent of the
promisee. Altho the latter may not perform the condition of accepting within the time limited, yet if he does, he is entitled to demand
performance." In Bishop on Contracts, Sec. 325, we read: "If a consideration for the undertaking to leave the offer open is given and
accepted, this constitutes of itself a contract, and the offer can not be
withdrawn."
In O'Brien v. Boland, 166 Mass. 481; and in Mansfield v. Hodgdon,
147 Mass. 304, an option for the sale of land under eal was held to be
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irrevocable and acceptance by the offeree to be unaffected by previous
attempted withdrawals of the offer. In the former case the Court said,
"In the present case, because the offer was under seal, it was an irrevocable covenant, conditional upon acceptance within ten days, and the
written acceptance within that time made it a mutual contract which
the plaintiff can enforce. Plaintiff was not bound to assent to the
withdrawal of the offer and could treat the withdrawal as inoperative.
The withdrawal, if itself a breach, was only one step toward the situation which would enable the plaintiff to ask for specific performance
in a court of equity." Here there is a simple contract having a valid
consideration. In the cases cited the contract was under seal.
At common law any offer under seal is irrevocable. The Courts
treat it as a "conditional covenant."
Mansfield v. Hodgdon, 147 Mass.
307. If an option under seal to sell is a covenant to sell upon condition,
by the same reasoning an option upon a valid consideration, but not
under seal, is a conditional contract to sell, and that condition is fulfilled by acceptance by the offeree in either case.
But it is not only on account of the weight of the authorities that
we decide that specific performance of this contract should be enforced.
We believe that it would be contrary to all the principles of justice and
fair-dealing, for the enforcement of which courts of equity exist, to
allow this defendant to keep this coin. If there is no adequate remedy
in damages for a failure to perform a contract to sell the coin, then,
clearly there is no adequate remedy in damages for his failure to allow
the plaintiff to exercise his right to buy. In neither case can the plaintiff procure another coin like that which the defendant promised to sell
to him.
The case of Douglas v. Halstead, 216 Pa. 292, seems to accord with
this view. There it was hdld that the rights of the holder of a "topoption"-that is to say, an option which is to operate only in case the
holder of a prior option or contract for the sale of land fails to take it
-are subordinate to the rights of the latter, hence, the latter is entitled
to maintain ejectment on his contract if the land is conveyed to the
former in violation of his rights.
In view of the injustice that inevitably would result from the adoption of the contention of the defendant-logical tho it seem-we willingly
accept the rule as asserted by the text-writers and in the cases that an
option, if founded upon a valuable consideration, like an option under
seal, is irrevocable and that an attempted revocation has no effect upon
the rights of the promisee in law or in equity.
Decree prayed for granted.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
It is generally held that when, for a consideration, a right is given
to purchase property within a certain time, if the promisee chooses, and
the person holding the option exercises it within the time and in the
manner specified, a valid contract is made, altho the person giving the
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option may have attempted to revoke it before acceptance. Brantley
on Contracts, 329.
The authorities frequently speak of such a transaction as constituting an irrevocable offer. Many of the cases which declare that an
option given for a valuable consideration amounts to an irrevocable
offer do so in obiters, as in such cases the offer was either accepted
before revocation or was not accepted until after the offer had lapsed
by effiux of time. This statement, however, is contrary to the legal
conception of an offer. There cannot be an irrevocable offer, because
an offer is simply the declaration of his will by one partly alone and,
tho the person who makes the offer agrees to keep it open this simply
amounts to a statement on his part that he will remain of the state of
mind, and even should he contract to do so, it would not follow that he
might not change his mind and terminate the offer. In such case he
would break his contract, but this is possible for him because a contract
incapable of being broken is a legal impossibility. Ashely on Contracts, Sec. 13. Langdell on Contracts, Sec. 178.
The option is not an offer of any sort, but is a unilateral contract.
"When my offer is, that if you pay me a certain sum you shall have the
right to purchase the property in the future if you choose and you accept this offer by paying the sum, a unilateral contract is formed upon
an executed consideration." Brantley on Contracts, 329. In return for
the consideration, the promisee has received a promise upon condition.
When he performs that condition by exercising his option, he is entitled
to enforce the promise, and if damages at law would in the particular
case be inadequate, he is entitled to specify performance. Page v.
Martin, 46 N. J. C. 593; Zimmerman v. Brown (N. J.), 75 Atl. 676, 9 Cyc.
287.
Even if the option is regarded as a mere contract to continue an
offer, the obstacles in the way of specific performance are not insuperable. To grant specific performance in such case, equity would have to
compel the parties to make a contract, and when it is thus made, compel the defendant to perform, and the plaintiff in his bill would have to
pray the specific performance of a contract not yet in existence. Equity
might, however, overcome these difficulties. In cases of a promise to
leave real property by will, equity compels the person taking the
property, whether by devise or inheritance, to convey to promisee.
The difficulty of compelling a living person to make a contract is no
greater than that of compelling a dead person to make a will, and if in
the latter case, tho specific performance of such an agreement is impossible, equity will do what is equivalent to specific performance, in order
that the "remedy may not be defeated by a device inconsistent with the
agreement," there is no good reason why equity should allow the remedy
in the former case to be defeated "by any device inconsistent with the
agreement." See Ashley on Contracts, Sec. 13. "Of the cases in which
an attempted revocation was made before the expiration of the time
fixed by the offer, many are cases in which specific performance would
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have been given had the offer been accepted before revocation. In
cases of this sort, if the offer is to remain open a fixed time and is on a
valuable consideration, equity ignores the attempted revocation, and
treats a subsequent acceptance exactly as if no attempted revocation
had been made; that is, it gives specific performance whenever that
remedy would have been given had such attempted revocation not been
made." Page on Contracts, Sec. 35. See especially Watts v. Kellar, 56
Fed. 1.
Judgment affirmed.

NATIONAL BANK v. JONES
Negotiable Instrument-Holder "in Due Course-Contract to
Compound a Felony-Act May 16, 1901
IN ASSUMPSIT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jno. Jones, son of the defendant and employed by one Trimmer,
stole certain articles from Trimmer, who threatens to prosecute him
for larceny unless the value of the things stolen is paid him. The defendant, a widow, executed a note for $3000.00, the estimated value of
the things stolen, payable to Trimmer or his order. Trimmer had the
note immediately discounted at plaintiff's banic. The defense to the
action on the note is that it was made without consideration and that
it was made to compound a felony.
Watkins for Plaintiff.
Sharp for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SHOECRAFT, 3.-The question involved in this case can be decided entirely under the Negotiable Instruments, Act of May 16, 1901:
A bill is negotiated in two ways, if payable to bearer, it is negotiated by delivery; if payable to order, it is negotiated by the indorsement of the holder completed by delivery.
A holder is prima facie considered as having taken same for value.
"The title of a person who negotiates an instrument is defective when
he obtained the instrument by fraud, duress or for an illegal consideration---but "a holder in due course holds the instrument free from
any defect of title of prior parties and free from defenses available to
prior parties among themselves, and may enforce payment of the instrument for the full amount thereof against all parties liable thereon."
S. Purdon, 3275; Vol. 3, 5358 P. & L.
As between the bank and Jones
this note was certainly valid, "for a note, though founded on an illegal
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and immoral consideration, is valid in the hands of a holder in due
course." S. Pardon, 3275, Vol. 3. A holder in "due course" is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions:
(1) "That it is complete and regular upon its face. (2) That he became the holder of it before it was overdue and without notice that it
had previously been dishonored, if such was the fact. (3) That he took
it in good faith and for value. (4) That at the time it was negotiated
to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in
the title of the person negotiating it." P. & L. 5573, Vol. 3. Under
this definition of a holder, in due course, the bank thus became one
when it received the note from Trimmer.
A note executed with the object of stifling a criminal prosecution for
a felony or misdemeanor is void, as between the original parties. Riddle
v. Hal, 99 Pa. 116. But when this note comes into the hands of a holder
in due course, the title is cleared, as in Henry v. State Bank & Laurens,
107 Ia., N. W. 1034, where a note was given to settle a prosecution for
embezzlement, it was held enforceable in the hands of an innocent
holder.
A note given in consequence of an agreement not to prosecute the
maker's son for forgery is void in hands of payee, National Bank v.
Kirk, 90 Pa. 49; and a note given in a stock gambling transaction is
void to payee, Northern National Bank v. Arnold, 187 Pa. 356, but in
Albertson v. Laughlin et al., 173 Pa. 525, a case similar in principle to
the two just preceding, the judge quotes Lord Mansfield, who said,
"AN holder coming fairly by a note has nothing to do with the transaction as between the original parties."
In view of the foregoing authorities, judgment must be entered for
plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
A note.given to compound a felony is valid in the hands of a bona
fide purchaser for value before maturity. American Bank v. Madison,
144 Ky. 152; 137 L. W. 1076, 8 Cyc. 45; Meadow v. Bird, 22 Ga. 246.
Even if the bank is not a holder, in due course, the note is enforceable, because it was enforceable in the hands of Trimmer. Where the
defense is that a contract should be avoided on the ground that it was
made to compound a felony, it must be shown that there was an agreement not to prosecute. In this case there was no agreement not to
prosecute. Threats of a prosecution, unless a certain security is given,
will not justify an inference that if the security is given the agreement
is that no prosecution will follow. Swope v. Ins. Co., 93 Pa. 251;
Hamilton v. Lockhart, 158 Pa. 452.
JudgmenL affirmed.
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COBLEIGH v. NEWELL
Conversion-Intent-Tender of the Chattel
ACTION OF CONVERSION
STATZMENT OF FACTS
Newell contracted to haul Cobleigh's horse to Philadelphia by rail.
He violated his contract and hauled it by water. Cobleigh refused to
accept the horse and sues for conversion.
Hollister for Plaintiff.
Kountz for Defendant.
OPINION OF THEF COURT
RICKLES, J.-Conversion is any distinct act of dominion exerted
over another's personal property, in denial of, or inconsistent with, his
rights therein. Aylesbury Mercantile Co. v. Fitch, 23 L. R. A. 573;
Story on Bailments; Pollock on Torts.
A constructive conversion takes place, when a person does such acts
in reference to the goods or personal chattels of another as to amount
in view of the law to an appropriation to himself. A direct conversion
takes place, when a person actually appropriates the property of another
to himself, or his own beneficial use and enjoyment, or to that of a third
person, or destroys it or alters its nature. A manual taking is not necessary.
With the above observations as to conversion, we will proceed to see
if Newell did, by his transporting the horse by water rather than by
rail, commit such a conversion as a court of law will hold him guilty of.
The first question to observe is, was there such a dominion over the
property as to be inconsistent with, or a denial of the rights of the
plaintiff over the property. The manner of his obtaining possession of
the horse was by contract, therefore his possession would not constitute a conversion, for he was rightfully in possession.
Are we then to consider every unauthorized use by a bailee, "and
that is what Newell was," of his bailor's property a conversion. It is
generally held by most courts of the Union that it is a conversion. In
Lucas v. Trumball, 15 Gray 307, the court instructed the jury that if the
hiring of a horse was to go to a certain point and the hirer drove a
greater distance beyond that point, that it amounted to a conversion,
and that the hirer was liable for all damages subsequently occurring,
and proof that the accident arose from the fault of the horse would not
exonerate the hirer. It will be observed that in this case no injury was
inflicted on the horse.
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In Wheelock v. Wheelright, 5 Mass. 109, it was decided that the
hirer, by riding the horse beyond the place for which he had contracted
to go, was answerable to the owner in trover. In this case, as in almost every other case holding this doctrine, there was an injury to the
horse or other property that had been misused. Hall v. Carcaran, 107
Mass. 251; Roth v. Hawes, 12 Pick. 136; Woodman v. Hubbard, 25 M. H.
67; Pellam v. Coeney, 117 Mass. 102; Welch v. Mohr, 93 Cal. 371, all
stand for the principle that driving beyond the place to which the hirer
contracted to go, amounts to a conversion of the horse. In all of these
cases the horse was injured. The basis of the conversion not being
whether or not the defendant received any advantage from the misuser,
but that the plaintiff was injured thereby. A wrongful intention is not
an essential element of the conversion, and it is sufficient if it appears
that the owner has been deprived of his property, or its condition has
been altered by the defendant's unauthorized act in assuming dominion
and control of the property. Boyce v. Brockway, 31 N. Y. 490; Laverty
v. Wathem, 68 N. Y. 522; Industrial and General Trust Co. v. Pod, 170 N.
Y. 233.
There has evidently been a tender of the horse in this case from the
fact that it has not been accepted by the plaintiff, he treating this as
converted property. This he had a right to do. If the property was
converted, the tender would not relieve Newell from liability for conversion.
Having satisfied ourselves that the fact of his not having the intent, or the fact of his having tendered the horse, does not exempt him
from liability for conversion. The remaining question is, did the manner of shipping the horse amount to such a dominion over the horse as
to amount to a denial of the owner's right, or inconsistent with the
same? Was the horse altered? Was there such a delay, by reason of
the transportation by water, as to bring the horse into the market at
such a time that he would bring less than had he been shipped by rail
and arrived in the market sooner.
Had any of the above conditions appeared, he would clearly have
been liable for the loss sustained in some cases, and in others for the
absolute conversion. But the only fact that appears is the bold allegation that he was shipped by a different method than that agreed upon.
It is in my opinion, with great justice, Judge Cooley says, in the
case of Blitz v. Union Steam Boat Co., 51 Mich. 558, a case very similar
to this, that the shippers bargained for the more desirable method of
transportation, and possibly agreed to pay a higher rate for it, but
inasmuch as the carrier used the other mode of transportation, and the
shipper alleges not one iota of injury in any manner or form whatever,
it would be the height of injustice to hold him liable for conversion.
In Doolittle v. Shaw, 92 Iowa 348, and reported in 26 L. R. A. 366,
quoting from Story on Bailments, it was said this question is still
deemed to be open to controversy. It must be borne in mind that in al-
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most every case where the strict rule has been applied, the defendant
has been guilty of negligence or wilful misconduct, or he has injured
or destroyed the property. The fact of shipping by water does not
of itself imply an assertion of ownership, or title, or dominion over the
horse, inconsistent with the plaintiff's title or property in -the horse.
The trend of modernism is to disregard little technicalities and render
decisions as the justice of the case demands. We consequently render
judgment for defendant.

OPINION OF SUPFRIOR COURT
We quite agree with the observation of Baron Bramwell that, "after
all, no one can undertake to define what a conversion is." Burroughs
v. Bayne, 5 H. & N. 296. The same learned judge has remarked that
most of the confusion which exists on the subject can be traced to two
sources. One is the use by the courts and text writers of such equivocal and indefinite phrases as "act of dominion," "exercise of control,"
etc.; the other is the. tendency of the courts to allow trover in cases
where the amount of damages would be the same if trespass or case
were brought, because of the total loss of the chattel.
Originally, when it was said that the defendant had converted a
chattel, what was meant was that,the defendant intended to receive and
did receive the full benefit of the chattel, thereby necessarily intending
to deprive and depriving the plaintiff permanently of all his rights in it.
At present it is wholly unnecessary either that the defendant receive or intend to receive any benefit, or that the plaintiff be deprived
of his right in the property, or that the defendant intend to deprive the
plaintiff of his rights in it.
Trover has, therefore, generally been allowed for misfeasances by a
bailee without any reference to this element of intent. It will be
noticed, however, that in most of these cases the property was accidentally destroyed during such wrongful use, or became a total loss later as
the result of such use, and therefore if the plaintiff had sued in case he
would have recovered the same amount of damages.
In several cases it has been held that a mere misfeasance by a
bailee does not constitute a conversion. Harvey v. Epes, 12 Grat. 153;
Shaw v. Doolittle, 92 Ia. 348; 26 L. R. A. 366, and it has been remarked
that "this rule seems to do substantial justice."
Hale on Bailments,
195. The rights of the bailor are sufficiently protected if the defendant
is held liable as an insurer during such wrongful use and for the delay
or loss, if any, caused thereby. It is not necessary to compel the defendant to buy the chattel at a price fixed by a jury.
Judgment affirmed.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
W X. PERRIN'S ESTATE
Wills- Revocation-Republication-Evidence
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Perrin made a will, having three months prior thereto written one
which he still preserved. He subsequently revoked the second will by
cutting out his signature, and he declared to a friend who was present
that he would write another'will next week, or, if not, his first will
should stand. He died, not having written another. The first will is
offered for probate.
Hoch for Plaintiff.
Rickles for Defendant.
OPINION OF THEi COURT
DUGHI, J.-The questions involved in this case are: 1. Was the
act of the testator in cutting out his name sufficient to revoke the second
will? 2. If so, was the first will revived thereby without any further
act of the testator?
Under the Wills act of Pa., enacted April 8, 1833, there are two ways
in which wills executed according to the required forms of law can be
revoked. One of these modes is by another will, or codicil, or other
writing declaring a repeal. This is a revocation by another and distinct instrument in writing. But to enable the will, codicil or other
writing to have such an effect, it must itself be complete and executed in
the prescribed manner, namely, as a will.
The other method to repeal is by something done to the will itself,
something more than intention expressed. It must be an intention to
annul carried into execution by acts done to the paper. This mode is
described in the statute as "burning, cannelling or obliterating or destroying same" by the testator.
The 13th sec. of the statute provides that "io will in writing concerning any real estate shall be repealed, nor shall any devise or direction therein be altered otherwise than by some other will or codicil in
writing, or other writing declaring the same, executed and proved, in
the same manner as is hereinbefore provided, or by burning, cancelling
or obliterating or destroying the same by the testator himself or by
some one in his presence and by his express direction."
The act doesn't declare /what shall amount to a cancellation, etc.
The words are not technical ones, and therefore the Legislature must
be presumed to have used them in their ordinary and commonly understood sense; and thus used, they secure the object the Legislature had
in view, i. e., a complete manifestation of an executed intention to repeal.
If a document should be entirely burned, obliterated or torn to bits,
there would be no doubt as to the intention of the testator. But it has
been held unnecessary to go to that extent in any of the modes in order
to satisfy the requirements of the statute; the slightest degree of either
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mode, provided it appears that the act was done animo revocandi, is
effectual as a revocation. 40 Cyc. 1190.
The burning, tearing or otherwise destroying a will must be done
with the intention to revoke it. It is not the mere manual operation of
destroying a will which will satisfy the requirement of the law, the act
must be accompanied with the intention to revoke in order to constitute
a legal revocation. 40 Cyc. 1187; Hise v. Hise, 31 Pa. 246; Rudy v. Ulrich,
69 Pa. 177; F]mernecker's Appeal, 218 Pa. 369; ]Evan's Appeal, 58 Pa. 238.
This last case further holds that a will may be cancelled by an act done
to the will which stamps on it an intention that it shall have no effect,
though the act be not a complete obliteration or physical destruction.
The tearing or cuttirg out of the signature of the testator revokes
the whole will, at least when no contrary intention appears. Gay v. Gay,
60 Iowa 415; Sanders v. Babbitt, 106 Ky. 646; in re-Kirkpatrick, 227 N.
J. Eq. 463; Townsend v. Howard, 86 Me. 285; Baptist Church v. Robbarts,
2 Pa. 110.
In this case, the testator deliberately cut out his signature, and that
he intended to revoke the first will is very clearly shown from his remark to the person present that he would write another will, but if he
did not, the first was to stand. That the second will was revoked, we
think, has been established beyond the peradventure of a doubt. The
mere act of cutting out his name, true, could not be called a destroying
or obliterating the will, but according to the great weight of authority,
as we have already shown, a complete destruction of a will is not necessary for its cancellation. All there need be is an intention to revoke,
coupled with an act, however slight, which manifests that intention.
As to the second principle involved in the case, we think it is a well
settled rule in most of the States of the Union, that a revocation of a
will revoking a prior will, establishes the will first executed, provided,
however, the first will still fulfils the requirements of the law.
All wills are in their nature inchoate until the death of the testator,
at which time the instrument becomes operative. The second will executed by Perrin was but an inchoate intention and by a wilful and deliberate act on his part, it became as if it had never existed. The prior
will being preserved in its entirety by the testator, and so far as appears
without a flaw, it became the will which would be consummated at his
death, unless prior to that time, he manifested a change in his intention
according to the prescribed rules of law. Lord Mansfield, in Goodright
v. Glazier, 4 Burr 2514 (found in 10 Pa. 82). says: "A will is ambulatory
until the death of the testator. If a testator does not let it stand till his
death, it isn't his will."
In this case, Perrin had two wills, and having cancelled the second,
and not having written another to replace it, the first one remained
which was never cancelled, and so it stands as his will.
Chief Justice McKean, in Lawson v. Morrison, 2 DalI. 286, says:
"The destruction of a will which repealed or superseded a previous one
leaves the first as if the second had not existed. Jarman in his work on
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Wills in 5th ed., vol. 1, page 294, and the 6th ed., vol. 1, page 120, says:
"Where an act of cancellation without making another will, so as to
fairly raise an inference that the testator meant the revocation of the
old will to depend on the efficacy of the new disposition intended to be
substituted, such will be the legal effect of the transaction; and therefore,
if the will intended to be substituted is inoperative from defect of attestation or any other cause, the revocation fails also, and the original
will remains in force." This is called "the doctrine of dependent relative revocation."
In Rudy v. Ulrich, 69 Pa. 177, it was held that a will may be revoked
by implication or directly, and that a cancellation of a second will which
revoked a former will, by implication, establishes the first will in full
force. In Flintham v. Bradford, 10 Pa. 80, it was held that the cancellation of a posterior will does of itself revive and restore a prior will
preserved by the testator.
As to admissibility of the statement of the testator in evidence to
show his intention of what should become of the first will, it is a well
settled rule that where it is shown that the testator has destroyed or
otherwise cancelled his will, the declarations made by him at that time
are admissible as part of the resgestae to show with what intent he
destroyed the instrument. 3 Wigmore, 1782; Evan's Appeal, 58 Pa.238;
Piekens v. Davis, 134 Mass. 252; Waterman v. Whitney, 11 N. Y. 157.
In 108 Pa., page 82, Chief Justice Mercnr says: ' It is well settled that
under the act of 1705, that a will might be republished by parol so as to
pass not only real estate which the testator owned not only at the time
of the making of the will, but also that which he afterwards acquired."r
Jack v. Shoenberger, 10 Harris 416. This case holds, as Campbell v.
Jamison, 8 Barr 497, expressly did-that the act of 1833 didn't expressly
prohibit a will to be republished by parol.
It would appear, therefore, from the foregoing, to be well established
that the act of cancellation, deliberately and intentionally performed,
of a posterior will does of itself revive and restore a prior will preserved
by the testator.
Decreed that the will be admitted to probate.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
It is not to be doubted that the testator's cutting out his signature
to a will is expressive of the intention that it shall no longer stand as a
will, and is an effectual revocation.
This will, so revoked, had been preceded by another, which the testator had preserved not only down to the execution, but down to the
cancellation, of the second, and down to his death. It does not appear
that the second will expressly revoked the first. Being, however, inconsistent with the first, it revoked the first by implication.
When a former will is thus revoked by a later, the revocation of the
later is regarded as a revival ilpofacto of the former, if still preserved,
or rather as evidence of the intention that the former shall again be-

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
come the will of the testator, to which intention, thus inferred, and not
otherwise proved, effect will be given. Flintham v. Bradford, 10 Pa.
82; Lausen v. Morrison, 2 DaUll. 286; Stephenson's Estate, 6 C. C. 628.
But it is quite possible that the testator has no intention to revive
the earlier will by the abrogation of the later. The scheme of disposal
of property in neither may longer satisfy him. He may prefer and intend to allow effect to that of the intestate law. He may intend to
write a third will, which will agree neither with either of the two prior
wills, nor with the arrangements of the intestate law. The testator
may declare in some way that he has no intention, in repealing his
latest will, to revive any earlier. His intention, thus revealed, will be
respected by the courts. They will decline to consider the earlier will
as reinstated.
Have we here any sufficient indication that the testator intended not
to revive the first will? He observed to a friend, when he cut his signature from the first will, that "he would write another will next week,
or if not, that his first will should stand." This, we think, may be
properly understood to mean that the first will should stand unless and
until another will should be executed. The intention to die intestate
was negatived. The first will was to operate unless a third will superseded it.
The words used by the testatrix in Manning's Appeal, 46 Super.
607, differ from those by the testator in the case before us. The testatrix caused the later of two wills to be burnt, saying, according to one
version, that "she was going to have a new will made." This revealed
the purpose, at that time, that the first will should not operate. Subsequently she delivered the first will to her husband, saying "that is my
will, you take care of it," etc. This, treated as a subsequent republication, was regarded as not sufficiently proved, because not proved by
two witnesses. The fact that it was proved by parol evidence was not
an objection. Forquer's Estate, 216 Pa. 331.
In Kerschner's Estate, 41 Super. 112, a testatrix who had made two
wills burnt the second, declaring that "the other last will shall count."
The court tacitly assumes that the validity of the first will depended on
the declaration of the testator's intention. The writer of the opinion
concludes that the parol evidence of republication was sufficient to sustain the will as a republished one. How many witnesses proved the
testatrix's declaration does not appear.
Flintham v. Bradford, supra,concerned itself, as Beaver, J., poinis
out in Kerschner's Estate, supra,with a will which was written before
the Wills act of 1833. We discover nothing in that act, however, which
changes the law with respect to republication.
We think that the learned court below has sufficiently discussed the
doctrines which are applicable to the solution of the question before it,
and therefore the
Appeal is di~misse4.

